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ABSTRACT
The emergence of stablecoins is a growing concern for authorities worldwide including
Indonesia as it could affect financial stability. Thus, if a central bank chooses to develop
a central bank digital currency (CBDC) to tackle this problem, the design should
conform to the country’s characteristics and consumer needs. This study draws on
experts’ opinions from various economic agents and utilises an amalgamation of the
analytic network process (ANP) and the Delphi method to show that the cash-like
CBDC model is the most appropriate digital currency design for Indonesia, since it
could enhance financial inclusion and reduce shadow banking in Indonesia.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this study, we identify the most suitable CBDC design for Indonesia. The
presence of digital currencies as a result of technological innovation and the
need to reduce the use of cash presents new challenges for economic agents,
including central banks. These changes in the payment landscape are marked
by new players offering the provision of virtual currency, as well as, by big
technology (big tech) and financial technology (fintech) firms providing financial
services (BIS, 2020).1 While providing alternatives to traditional payment systems,
which have the potential to lower transaction costs, digital currencies also pose
significant risks and problems (Latimer & Duffy, 2019). Cryptocurrencies, such as
Bitcoin and Ethereum, are highly volatile and lack guaranteed convertibility and
security (Beau, 2020).2 The recent introduction of stablecoins solves this issue of
price stability3. However, it does not offer services, in terms of asset settlements,
especially those used interchangeably between commercial bank money and
central bank money (Beau, 2020). Despite the fact that big tech and fintech firms
are ushering in a more consumer-centric experience through the use of data
analytics, customer omnichannels which overlay services, and lending provisions
(P2P), the credit risks involved in using stablecoins are high (Petralia, Philippon,
Rice, & Veron, 2019). These firms have grown significantly in China, and are
starting to become more active in other developing countries, such as India and
Indonesia (Petralia et al., 2019), although only concentrated in major cities for the
latter (Iman, 2018).
Alongside with its prominent millennial population4, massive internet
penetration5, immense electronic money adoption6 and 130 million Facebook users7,
Indonesia is a huge potential market for stablecoins penetration, especially for the
Facebook Libra platform. Although Indonesia prohibits the use of digital currency
(including stablecoins) as a means of payment, the public has the opportunity to
own and use Libra as a cryptoasset if the asset is traded in Indonesia through an
official exchange (registered under the authority of Bappebti8). Thus, there is a risk
of regulatory arbitrage in the use of cryptoassets that can still be used as a medium
of exchange, especially for online/e-commerce transactions. Therefore, the risks to
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Advances in financial technology (fintech) is one of the major drivers in the rapid growth of nonbank institutions that provide financial services, namely shadow banking (see Sheng & Soon, 2016).
The volatility of these digital currencies could worsen following the disruption of markets, which
has been fueled by the COVID-19 pandemic (see Devpura and Narayan, 2020; Iyke, 2020a,b; Phan
and Narayan, 2020; Vidya and Prabheesh, 2020; Narayan, 2020a, b, c; Salisu Sikiru, 2020; Narayan et
al. 2020).
Stablecoins are digital currencies which rely on a set of stabilization method to minimize the
fluctuation of its values (Bullman, Klemm, & Pinna, 2019). The first stable coin is “Realcoin” and
later renamed into “Tether” which was first announced in July 2014.
Indonesia Central Bureau of Statistics projects that Indonesia’s millennials (i.e. the population age
between 21 – 36) would be 63,5 million people by 2020 (IDN Research Institute, 2020).
Indonesia is the fourth largest country with the highest number of internet users in the world (171,26
million users), after China (854 million users), India (560 million users), and United States (313,2
million users) (Statista, 2020).
The growth rate of electronic money adoption is 70,7% per annum as at May-2020 (Bank Indonesia).
See Statista (2020).
The commodity futures trading supervisor in Indonesia.
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the financial system stability and consumer protection issues need to be addressed
if stablecoins become publicly accepted.
Various policies are embraced by central banks, so that households and
businesses can still have secure and efficient payment choices (BIS, 2020). In
China, the central bank improved information transparency and ensured that the
circulation of money outside of the bank will return to the banking system, by
providing payment system infrastructure, as well as, imposing prudent regulations
(Qian, 2019). However, these proved to be costly, in terms of its regulation and
policy. Meanwhile, other central banks chose the CBDC in smoothing the payment
system and improving the soundness of monetary policy (Qian, 2019). Since
developing the CBDC is also very costly and risky for central banks (Zang, 2020),
proper planning is required.
These issues triggered several central banks to develop their CBDCs and
spurred a growing research on CBDCs. Initially, there were two major types of
CBDC studies: firstly, those which focused on the definition and characteristics of
CBDCs (see, for example, CPMI, 2015; Gouveia et al., 2017; Bech and Garratt, 2017)
and secondly, studies which explored the use of CBDCs (see, example, Boar et al.,
2020; Meaning, 2017). However, the literature is still at the nascent stage and does
not explore the design process of CBDCs. Nevertheless, understanding what goes
into the designing of CBDCs is necessary to meet the everchanging public needs
and to conform to a country’s unique characteristics.
Like in other countries, the literature on CBDCs in the Indonesian context is
limited and is dominated by the central bank’s studies.9 In general, the Indonesian
CBDC literature can be divided into three major group of studies: those focusing on
the description of the CBDC and its uses worldwide (such as, Peranginangin et al.,
2006; Hutabarat et al., 2016, 2018); those focusing on the potential implications of
CBDC implementation (Yosamartha et al., 2017); and those focusing on designing
the CBDC scheme for Indonesia (Bank Indonesia, 2018). The last group is quite
unique, because such studies are very scarce. In fact, to our knowledge, only Bank
Indonesia (2018) offered recommendations for implementing the CBDC scheme
in Indonesia. However, since all these studies were conducted by the monetary
authority, they did not offer a conceptual CBDC model that fits Indonesian
conditions because they were mainly derived from regulators’ perspective.
Moreover, these studies only relied on literature review and excluded a systematic
approach to designing the CBDC model. Therefore, further research is necessary
to better understand the motivation and design criteria of the CBDC.
Hence, this study constructs a conceptual framework to identify the most
suitable CBDC design for Indonesia. Based on this conceptual framework, the
study also analyses and proposes a specific CBDC model, which corresponds
to the Indonesian conditions by utilizing primary data, unlike previous studies.
We expand the CBDC literature, in general, by exploring the CBDC design
through systematic decision-making process, and by taking into consideration the
perspective of regulators, academicians and market practitioners in Indonesia. To
achieve this goal, we introduce a novel method, which combines the ANP and
9

It should be noted that even though the central bank have extensive research on CBDC, it cannot be
concluded that Indonesia will implement CBDC in the near future.
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the Delphi method, robust to the endogeneity problem. Our Delphi–ANP method
involves regulators, academicians, and experts, prioritizing the best model criteria
by considering interdependencies between the criteria. We then further refined the
model using the Delphi method to identify the CBDC model criteria appropriate
for Indonesia.
The study revealed that the CBDC model best suited for Indonesia is the cashlike CBDC model, a general-purpose (retail) CBDC, which shares very similar
characteristics to traditional currencies, in that it is universal, anonymous, peer-topeer, and non-yield bearing. This finding is similar to the CBDC models currently
developed by the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), which PwC (2019) suggests is
similar to the current Indonesian fintech landscape.
Regulators and market practitioners can benefit from this study, since it
designs and implements a suitable CBDC model for the Indonesian environment.
Our study offers a fresh perspective on CBDCs as it develops a novel approach,
combining the Delphi method with the ANP method, and uses experts’ opinions
to derive the most suitable CBDC model for Indonesia. Our approach can therefore
be combined with existing exploratory-based approaches to design robust CBDC
platforms for countries like Indonesia.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores the
literature on CBDCs and how it relates to the implementation of a CBDC in
Indonesia, Section 3 explains our methodology, Section 4 discusses the findings,
and Section 5 concludes the paper.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The development of digital currency is inseparable from the thought of Friedrich
Hayek10, a Nobel Laureate in economics, who suggested that the government should
not have monopoly over the issuance of money (Hayek, 1990). The introduction of
Bitcoin in 2008 could end the monopoly of money creation from the central bank
as Hayek thought (Nabilou, 2019; Gans & Halaburda, 2015)11. Since 2008, Bitcoin
and several other digital currencies12 have become alternative means of payment,
despite state money (Dwyer, 2015). On the whole, these currencies brought upon
major innovations to the traditional payment system: changing physical currency
to its digital form, private issuance, and technological innovation (Auer & Bohme,
2020; Velde, 2013). Currently over 600 digital currencies operate throughout the
internet and substantially borderless system (Latimer & Duffy, 2019).
In response to the global spread of digital currencies, international agencies
and central banks published reports assessing their shortcomings. The European
Banking Authority (EBA), Financial Action Task Force (FATF), European Central
Bank (ECB), and the Deutsche Bank focus on the fact that virtual currency is an
unregulated digital money that can be transferred, stored, and traded electronically
10

11

12

Friedrich Hayek was an English-Austrian economist and a Nobel Laureate in economics for his
theory of money and economic fluctuations (Schrepel, 2014).
The digital currency named Bitcoin was conceived by Satoshi Nakamoto (pseudonym identity) and
made available to user group on the internet in 2008 (Elendner et al., 2018) (Dwyer, 2015) (Bohme et
al., 2015).
Digital currencies are cryptocurrencies or virtual currencies, which do not physically exist as a coin
or note (Latimer & Duffy, 2019; Motsi-Omoijiade, 2018; Michaels & Homer, 2018).
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and does not have legal tender status (Mobert, 2018; ECB, 2012). Additionally,
even though virtual currency operates like a currency in some environment, it
could not give the public confidence that its value is relatively stable over time
(Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017; Gerstein & Hervieux-Payette, 2015). As such, there is no
common consensus on the definition of digital currency but a profound similarity
is that it is not issued or guaranteed by any jurisdiction and is unable to perform
the essential functions of money (McKinney et al., 2015). Digital currency is also
too volatile to be a reliable store of value, is not widely accepted as a means of
exchange, and is not used as a unit of account (BOE, 2020)
As technology continues to develop, new forms of money are also emerging.
Some privately issued stablecoins aim to overcome the shortcomings of digital
currencies and provide stability of value via some form of backing (ManciniGriffoli & Adrian, 2019). However, the emergence of stablecoins13 have become
a growing concern for authorities worldwide. Stablecoins could affect financial
stability, if many people make the switch, especially if a depreciation in domestic
currency seems imminent (Mancini-Griffoli & Adrian, 2019).14 For example,
stablecoins, such as Libra, could have broader impact because people tend to be
global followers. Moreover, the use of multiplatform Libra through social media
could escalate the adoption rate of stablecoins. Indonesia’s status as the third
largest Facebook user in the world15 has made the country a potential market for
Libra but has also exposed it to the risks associated with this currency. Stablecoins
could potentially be widely adopted over existing payment systems, according
to a recent study.16 But given the risks they could pose, it may be worth asking
whether the CBDC can be designed to better meet people needs and conform to a
country’s characteristics.17
Although the term of CBDC includes the words digital currency, CBDC is
fundamentally different from digital currency. As a Central Bank Money (CeBM),
CBDC is a central bank’s liability denominated in the local unit of account, which
can be used as a medium of exchange and store of value (CPMI, 2018). The main
difference between CBDC and digital currency is the level of centralization in
the creation, settlement and destruction process, which is centralized under the
control of the central bank and its status as a legal tender (Mohamed, 2020; Bohme
et al., 2015; Nabilou, 2019). Bech & Garratt (2017) divide CBDC into two models,
namely wholesale and general-purpose CBDC. They combine the dimension of
digital currency with the taxonomy of money, known as the Money Flower.18 This
taxonomy was then further developed by CPMI (2018), which stated that CBDC
13

14
15

16
17

18

Stablecoins create digital tokens or coins and are intended for use either in retail or wholesale
payment systems, i.e. thether, libra, JPM coin, and signet (Mohacsi, 2020; G7 Working Group on
Stablecoins, 2019).
See also G7 Working Group on Stablecoins (2019).
Leading countries based on Facebook audience are India (280 million), USA (190 million), and
Indonesia (130 million) (Statista, 2020).
See G7 Working Group on Stablecoins (2019).
The emergence of stablecoins brings potential risk on financial integrity, anti-money laundering
regime, consumer and data protection, cyber resilience and tax compliance (G7 Working Group on
Stablecoins, 2019).
For early CBDC concept and the development of money flower taxonomy, see CPMI (2015), Bech &
Garratt (2017) and Bjerg (2017).
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can be account-based or token-based. According to CPMI (2018) there are three
CBDC models, namely general-purpose token, wholesale token, and generalpurpose accounts.19 The motive of CBDC issuance might differ in each jurisdiction.
This motive leads to the design of CBDC based on its features, namely anonymity,
availability, interest-bearing, limits on holding, and transfer mechanism (CPMI,
2018).
Over the last decade, there are more authorities working on the design and
implementation of CBDC, focusing on either the wholesale or general-purpose
models. Bank of Canada’s Jasper Project, Bank of Thailand’s Inthanon Project, the
South African Reserve Bank’s Khokha Project, and the Deutsche Bundesbank’s
Blockbaster Project are wholesale-based CBDCs used for interbank payments
(Lannquist, 2019; Deutsche Bundesbank, 2018). Moreover, the wholesale CBDC
in cross-border payments has been explored by the European Central Bank and
the Bank of Japan in the Stella Project, as well as, by the Monetary Authority of
Singapore in Project Ubin (Lannquist, 2019). These CBDC projects are generally
running on the Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) based platforms.
Unlike the wholesale CDBC model, the general-purpose CBDC is conducted
either on the DLT or non-DLT platforms. The Riksbank, People Bank of China,
and governments of Tunisia and Venezuela utilised the DLT on their CBDC pilot
(Shirai, 2019). In contrast, the Dinero Electronico Project by Bank of Equador
and the e-Peso Project by Bank of Uruguay were conducted on non-DLT based
platforms (Barontini & Holden, 2019). All in all, the chosen CBDC model has a
correlation with the motive of the central bank or government as the issuer. The
general-purpose CBDC model is broadly related to issues around cash, responding
to dwindling use, dollarization, shadow banking or financial inclusion, while the
motivation for using wholesale CBDC is to improve payment efficiency and safety
(Barontini & Holden, 2019).
Prior studies on CBDC focused more on its implications, particularly on the
stability of the financial system, monetary policy, as well as, on the payment system
(CPMI, 2018; BOE, 2020). Besides, most of these studies only provide an overview
of the CBDC models that are being implemented in emerging economies (Boar et
al., 2020; Shirai, 2019; Barontini & Holden, 2019; Hileman & Rauchs, 2017). As an
emerging economy, there is also a growing interest to deepen the understanding
of CBDCs in Indonesia.
The literature discussing CBDCs in Indonesia is scarce, and the few studies
are mostly conducted by the central bank. This literature covers the description
of CBDC concept and its worldwide use (Hutabarat et al., 2018; Bank Indonesia,
2017; Perangingangin et al., 2016), the potential implications of CBDCs, with
respect to monetary policy, financial stability, payment system, information
technology, and legal aspects (Kinanthi et al., 2019; Sahabat et al., 2017; Harahap
et al., 2017; Yosamartha et al., 2017; Trianti et al., 2017; Bank Infonesia, 2017), and
the design of CBDC for Indonesia (Bank Indonesia, 2018). However, none of these
19

Following CPMI (2018), the term ‘general purpose (GP)’ refers to the CBDC that is intended for use
by anyone (broad access) and ‘wholesale’ refers to the CBDC, which accessible to selected parties.
The GP model could be arranged in a token or account based, while the wholesale CBDC can ideally
be implemented in token form only.
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studies utilised primary data. We add to these studies using primary data and
a systematic approach in order to propose the most suitable CBDC model for
Indonesia. This CBDC model takes into account the country’s conditions and will
therefore minimize the risks associated with digital currencies.
Nugroho (2018) evaluates CBDCs based on their transaction cost.20 He focuses
on finding which economic agent will bear most transaction costs when CBDCs
are introduced. Our study follows Nugroho (2018), in that it involves the opinions
or perspectives of other entities—beside central banks—to minimize biases in the
determination the most suitable CBDC design for Indonesia. However, unlike
Nugroho (2018), our study involves a wide range of experts, in order to better
represent various agents in the economy. The range of respondents are from the
fiscal regulatory, diverse divisions of the central bank (monetary, macroprudential,
and payment system divisions), commercial banks, academicians, and payment
system providers (fintech), since Indonesia is one of the countries, whose fintech
industry is growing rapidly in Southeast Asia (Euromonitor, 2020; PwC, 2019;
Minerva, 2016). These experts’ opinions formed the foundation on which we
devised the CBDC model that conforms to the country’s characteristics.
Our study is also in line with Auer & Bohme (2020), who contended that the
design of a CBDC model should be based on an approach that caters for consumer
needs. We show that the cash-like CBDC model is the most applicable design for
Indonesia using the Delphi–ANP approach, which draws on experts’ opinions.
This general-purpose model could enhance financial inclusion and reduce shadow
banking that tend to be challenges in emerging economies (Boar, Holden, &
Wadsworth, 2020; Qian, 2019).
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data
The study uses primary data derived from in-depth interviews, Focus Group
Discussions (FGD) and questionnaires. Our sample involved 18 respondents,
who represent economic agents, such as the government (central bank and fiscal
regulator), firms (commercial banks and payment system providers/fintech
providers), and individual/households (academicians). The number of respondents
in this study outweighs the ideal number for organising small FGD, which generally
range from four to six respondents (Gibbs, 1997). However, according to Ascarya
(2014), Sakti et al. (2019), and Ziglio (1996), mastery and competence in their
respective fields are the most important factors to be considered when selecting
respondents for the ANP–Delphi method. Hence, the number of respondents does
not matter.

20

Nugroho (2018) use transaction cost economics (TCE) framework to evaluate CBDC design. The
coverage of transaction costs consists of three transactional dimensions: uncertainty, transaction
frequency, and asset specificity.
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B. Research Methodology
Our study can be considered as a frontier research, since the CBDC has not yet been
implemented in any country. Therefore, the ANP method is utilised to organise
thoughts, experiences, and to elicit judgments recorded in memory and quantify
them in the form of priorities, as well as, allow for the representation of diverse
opinions after discussion and debate (Saaty & Vargas, 2006). The ANP method helps
by providing a decision-making framework for choosing the best CBDC model for
a country. While Boar et al. (2020), Shirai (2019), Barontini & Holden (2019), and
Nugroho (2018) used a survey to conduct further analysis about CBDC designs
in certain jurisdictions, we use the ANP method to gain a deeper understanding
about a CBDC design which conforms to a country’s characteristics and any other
important criteria. The model is then be further refined using the Delphi method
to identify the CBDC model criteria that accommodate local wisdom in Indonesia.
We discuss the Delphi–ANP method, in more detail, in what follows.
C. The Delphi–ANP Method
The ANP is a mathematical theory that is able to analyse the effect of elements
which interact by using an assumptions approach to solve problems. The ANP
method explains the dependent factors and the network feedback for decisionmaking through the consideration and validation of empirical experience (Saaty,
2001). By using network feedback, elements can depend on components, such as
the hierarchical network, but can also be relied on by other elements (Saaty L. T.,
2005). The ANP can easily be applied to decision-making, evaluation, forecasting,
mapping, strategising, and the allocation of resources (Saaty & Vargas, 2006).
The Delphi method uses a survey approach, consisting of two or more
repetitive processes to collect data and refine data, with the series of processes
and analyses accompanied by feedback (Hsu & Sandford, 2007). This method
encourages participants to give an opinion and an initial assessment of the
formation of the CBDC model in Indonesia. The main characteristic of the Delphi
method is the participant feedback process that can be controlled to reduce noise
through a problem-solving orientation. The Delphi method contains a scope for
evaluating, finding facts, exploring problems, and being a flexible tool for analysis.
As discussed in III.1, we collected data through FGDs made up of regulators,
academicians, and practitioners. By combining the Delphi method with the ANP
method, we involved experts in a participatory and consensus development
process to eliminate inaccurate information about CBDC with respect to the
Indonesian economic conditions. Following Ascarya (2014), the Delphi–ANP
method is displayed Figure 1.
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Figure 1.
Delphi-ANP Method
This figure shows the Delphi–ANP method used in our study. Stage 1 starts from literature review and terminates at
Delphi ranking. In Stage 2, we construct and validate the ANP model. Stage 3 designs pairwise questionnaires and
synthesises and analyses data. Stage 4 validates and interprets the results.
Literature
Review

Focus Group
Discussion

Indepth Discussion

Stage 1

Semi Structured Delphi
Questionnaire
Structured Delphi
Questionnaire

Stage 3

Stage 4

ANP Construction Model
ANP Validation Model

EXPERT

Stage 2

RESEARCHER

Delphi Ranking

Pairwise Questionnaire
Data Synthesis and Analysis
Result Validation
Result Interpretation

We delivered questionnaires to respondents in order to establish the criteria
and elements formed. After receiving the responses from the respondents, we
refined the questionnaires, redistributed, and recollected them to ensure that they
are well-structured. We then reused the compiled questionnaires as a questionnaire
instrument in the second round of data collection. The construction of the ANP
model is based on theoretical and empirical literature reviews and poses questions
to respondents through in-depth interviews. At the in-depth interview stage, we
carried out the Delphi method to obtain the final results that will determine the
criteria in the ANP model.
The quantification stage of the model uses the questions in the ANP
questionnaires in the form of a pairwise comparison between elements in the
cluster to establish which of the two has a greater influence, where the size of
the difference is on a numerical scale from 1 to 9 (Saaty, 2005; Saaty & Vargas,
2006). The influence of feedback in ANP framework requires a large matrix named
supermatrix, which is outlined as follows:

Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2020

9

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Vol. 23, No. 3 [2020], Art. 3
420

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 23, Number 3, 2020

(1)

Assume that cluster h, denoted by Ch, h=1,..., N, has nh elements. Elements in
cluster h, denoted by eh1, eh1, … ,
, where wij is named a block of the supermatrix.
To produce the ratio scale, we use three calculations from the supermatrix (1),
consisting of: (i) Unweighted Supermatrix, which is the original of column
eigenvectors obtained from the paired comparison matrix of elements; (ii)
Weighted Supermatrix, where each block of column eigenvector from a cluster
is weighted with priority of the influence of each cluster; and (iii) Limiting
Supermatrix, obtained by lifting a weighted supermatrix with a large rank (Saaty
& Vargas, 2006).
D. The Benefit, Opportunity, Cost, Risk Approach
Our Delphi–ANP method entails the Benefit, Opportunity, Cost, Risk (BOCR)
approach, which helps in determining the priorities for selecting the best CBDC
model based on calculating the desired criteria (benefits) and unwanted criteria
(costs), as well as, the criteria based on events in the future, which may occur as
positive things (opportunities) and things that can lead to negative effect (risks)
(Saaty & Vargas, 2006; Simelyte et al., 2014).
The prioritised alternatives are obtained from three results: standard condition
(B/C), pessimistic (B/(C×R)), and realistic ((B×O)/(C ×R)). To make the final decision,
Wijnmalen (2007) and Simelyte et al. (2014) recommend employing five different
synthesis methods as follows:
Additive method:
(2)
Probabilistic additive:
(3)
Subtractive:
(4)
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol23/iss3/3
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Multiplicative
(5)
Multiplicative priority powers:
(6)
where b, o, c, and r are normalised weights of merits B, O, C, and R, respectively;
Bi, Oi, Ci, and Ri represent the synthesised results of the alternative I under merit
B, O, C, and R, respectively.
Equation (2), the marginal value for short-term decision formula, in which
benefit is multiplied by opportunity, divided by costs multiplied by risk for each
alternative is expected yield negative results. This method obtains marginal value,
and is considered as a method to synthesise a short-term decision. Meanwhile,
Equation (3), the marginal value for long-term decision formula, is considered as
a method to synthesise a long-term decision (Saaty and Özdemir, 2005; Saaty and
De Paola, 2017).
E. Model Construction and Robustness Checks
We employed a the two-layer ANP model. The first layer includes two main
clusters, namely (i) strategic criteria cluster and (ii) BOCR cluster, where each of
the cluster has four sub-clusters with different elements. The design of the elements
are derived from the identification of problems carried out through the literature
review process and strengthened through the FGD process. The second layer
is BOCR cluster, which consists of sub-clusters, namely benefits, opportunities,
costs and risks. Each of the sub-clusters is linked to the respective CBDC design
alternative clusters consisting of model 1 (cash-like), model 2 (general purpose,
indirect, non-interest bearing), model 3 (wholesale, direct, interest bearing), model
4 (wholesale, direct, non interest bearing), and model 5 (general purpose, direct,
interest bearing). The two-layer ANP model is displayed in Figure 2.
In a robustness check, we analyze how the model behaves when the
specifications are changed. We utilize two approaches in order to perform the
robustness check. In the first, we use a conceptual framework for the one-layer
ANP model to check whether the two-layer ANP model is robust. If the results
change due to changes in the model are not significant or are relatively small, then
we can interpret this as evidence of the structural validity of our model (Xun &
Halbert, 2014). Unlike the two-layer ANP model, the one-layer ANP model does
not distinguish between alternatives in each aspect of benefit, opportunity, cost,
and risk. The second approach involves using sensitivity analysis on the chosen
alternative model, also understood as a dynamic analysis, used to examine the
effect of variations in assessment of the stability of the final result. We performed
the sensitivity analysis to determine whether the overall results (obtained using
the alternative models) vary, if there is a change in the relationship, in terms of
benefits, opportunities, costs, and risks (Saaty & Vargas, 2006).
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Figure 2.
ANP 2-Layer Model
This figure shows the 2-Layers ANP model construction
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Model Validity: Rater Agreement of Delphi-Likert and Delphi-ANP
The initial assessment of the Delphi-Likert process is carried out to validate the
convergence of the respondents’ opinions from the Delphi FGD and to obtain
a valid model construction. The assessment is processed to display the level of
agreement (rater agreement) or Kendall’s W to the clusters and elements that have
been formed.
The first half of Table 1 shows that, in the first round, 10 of the 11 clusters
in the model reached the same consensus (or converged), as indicated by the
significance (p-value) on the Kendall’s W value, which is a reflection of the value of
the rater agreement. In the second round, after adjusting for outlier answers, the
cluster function attains significance at the 10% level when it had previously been
insignificant. Thus, there has been consensus in all clusters in the construction of
the ANP model. This shows that the construction of the ANP model in this study
can be considered valid.
The Delphi–ANP process is carried out to determine the consistency of the
respondents’ assessment in the level of agreement of each cluster. The ranking
results and opinions were recapitulated for elimination based on the five elements
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that obtained the highest geometric ranking values for each cluster. The second
half of Table 1 shows that 9 of the 11 clusters in the model reach convergent
answers. In the second round, after adjusting the outliers among the respondents’
answers in the opportunities and cost clusters, the value becomes significant at the
10% significance level. The consensus in all clusters shows that the ANP model can
be considered valid.
Table 1.
Rater Agreement of Delphi–Likert and Delphi–ANP
This table shows the value of the level of agreement (rater agreement) or W-Kendall for clusters and elements that
have been formed in Delphi-Likert and Delphi-ANP. A significant level of agreement value can also be seen from the
p-value at *, **, and *** denote significance at the10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

CLUSTER

Strategic
Criteria
Objective
Function
Characteristic
Motives
Bocr Criteria
Benefit
Opportunities
Costs
Risk
Alternative
(Design)

Delphi- Likert
Round 1
Round 2
KenKendall’s p-value dall’s
p-value
W
W

Delphi-ANP
Round 1
Round 2
KenKendall’s p-value
dall’s p-value
W
W

0.175

0.098*

0.175

0.098*

0.265

0.002***

0.265

0.002***

0.225
0.098
0.284
0.471
0.316
0.318
0.306
0.228
0.182

0.005**
0.272
0.001***
0.000***
0.006***
0.000***
0.000***
0.003***
0.008***

0.225
0.147
0.284
0.471
0.316
0.318
0.306
0.228
0.182

0.005**
0.088*
0.001***
0.000***
0.006***
0.000***
0.000***
0.003***
0.009***

0.153
0.427
0.426
0.588
0.211
0.165
0.099
0.058
0.134

0.026**
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.009***
0.018**
0.128
0.382
0.047**

0.153
0.427
0.426
0.588
0.211
0.165
0.129
0.128
0.134

0.026**
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.009***
0.018**
0.054*
0.055*
0.047**

0.155

0.018**

0.155

0.018**

0.169

0.016**

0.169

0016**

B. Priority Cluster and Sub-Cluster
B1. Priority Cluster in Strategic Criteria
The results of the two-layer ANP with BOCR approach for the whole of the
strategic criteria cluster, shown in Table 2, reveal that the main priority of the
strategic criteria when establishing the CBDC model in Indonesia is objective
(39%), followed by characteristic and function clusters, which have the same
value (24%), and motive (14%). Meanwhile, the value of the rater agreement in the
criteria strategy cluster shows the agreement value for practitioners, academician,
and overall respondents. This is also indicated by the statistical significance at 10%
level (see the p-values).
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Table 2.
Strategic Criteria Two-Layer ANP Model
This table shows the geometric mean values for the priority values of each category of respondents, the value of
agreement level based on Kendall’s W and the value of the consistency of answers based on the inconsistency value
in the strategic criteria cluster. Note that, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

1. Objective
2. Function
3. Characteristic
4. Motive
Inconsistency
Kendall’s W
X2
p-value

Practitioner

Academicians

Regulator

All

R

0.430
0.190
0.190
0.190
0.003
0.378
6.800
0.079*

0.371
0.167
0.349
0.113
0.006
0.353
6.350
0.096*

0.308
0.308
0.246
0.138
0.008
0.106
1.900
0.593

0.392
0.236
0.236
0.137
0.007
0.158
8.550
0.036**

1
3
2
4

Table 2 also displays the highest inconsistency values of the respondents’
pairwise comparison of answers for the relationships between clusters in the ANP
network. It can be concluded that the cluster strategy consistency test results for
the two-layer ANP with the BOCR approach meet the consistency requirements of
the respondents’ answers because the inconsistency value is less than 10%.
B2. Priority Sub-Cluster in Strategic Criteria
The results for the two-layer ANP with the BOCR approach, in Table 3, show that
the respondents generally agreed that the main strategy using the objective cluster
for CBDC issuance is a smooth payment system (25%), strengthening the stability
of the financial system, and interoperability (25%), followed by the supervision
of national financial transactions, and efficiency of money distribution (12%). The
value of the rater agreement in the objective cluster shows the agreement value for
the practitioner category and overall respondents per category, as indicated by the
p-values, which are significant at 5% and 10% levels.
Table 3.
Detailed ANP Strategic Criteria Results
This table shows the geometric mean value to see the priority value of each category of respondents, the value of
agreement level based on Kendall’s W and the value of the consistency of answers based on the value of inconsistencies
in the Strategic Criteria cluster in detail. Note that, *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.

Practitioner
OBJECTIVE
1. Smooth payment system
2. Surveillance of national transaction
3. Efficiency in printing & handling
money
4. Interoperability
5. Strengthen financial system stability
Inconsistency
Kendall’s W

https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol23/iss3/3
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Academicians Regulator

All

R

0.106
0.153

0.464
0.102

0.274
0.239

0.250
0.125

1
5

0.294

0.123

0.062

0.125

4

0.294
0.153
0.008
0.329

0.123
0.189
0.000
0.257

0.150
0.274
0.000
0.185

0.250
0.250
0.000
0.219

3
2
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Table 3.
Detailed ANP Strategic Criteria Results (Continued)
Practitioner
X2
p-value
FUNCTION
1. Medium of Exchange
2. Means of Payment
3. Store of Value
4. Unit of Account
5. Standard of Deferred Payment
Inconsistency
Kendall’s W
X2
p-value
CHARACTERISTIC
1. Universally Accepted
2. Non-Yield Bearing
3. Anonymity
4. Peer to Peer
5. Pseudonymous
Inconsistency
Kendall’s W
X2
p-value
MOTIVE
1. Transaction
2. Interparty Trust
3. Saving/Investment
4. Precautionary
5. Philanthropy
Inconsistency
Kendall’s W
X2
p-value

Academicians Regulator

All

R

7.900
0.095**

6.167
0.187

4.433
0.351

15.75
0.003***

0.167
0.263
0.287
0.158
0.124
0.000
0.163
3.900
0.420

0.264
0.264
0.144
0.264
0.065
0.000
0.201
4.833
0.305

0.356
0.236
0.130
0.200
0.078
0.000
0.171
4.100
0.393

0.255
0.221
0.221
0.221
0.081
0.000
0.144
10.367
0.035**

1
2
3
4
5

0.430
0.274
0.068
0.114
0.114
0.000
0.161
3.867
0.424

0.377
0.225
0.068
0.262
0.068
0.004
0.426
10.233
0.037**

0.397
0.275
0.063
0.165
0.100
0.000
0.263
6.313
0.177

0.442
0.191
0.068
0.191
0.109
0.000
0.243
17.46
0.002***

1
2
5
3
4

0.341
0.341
0.142
0.094
0.082
0.000
0.513
12.30
0.015**

0.475
0.124
0.204
0.124
0.072
0.004
0.490
11.78
0.019**

0.348
0.348
0.091
0.149
0.063
0.000
0.518
12.43
0.014**

0.392
0.255
0.145
0.145
0.063
0.000
0.451
32.47
0.000***

1
2
3
4
5

The ANP results for the CBDC issuance sub-cluster function demonstrate
that respondents generally agreed that “medium of change” (25%) is the most
important element, followed by “means of payment”, “unit of account” and “store
of value”, all of which had the same value (22%) and, finally, the “standard of
deferred payment” element (8%). The value of the rater agreement in the function
sub-cluster shows the value of the agreement for the overall respondent or by
category, which is indicated by the significant p-value.
Regarding the CBDC motive sub-cluster, the respondents generally agreed
that “transaction” (40%) is the most important element, followed by “interparty
trust” (25%), then the “saving/investment” and “precautionary” (14%), and finally
the “philanthropy” element (6%). Meanwhile, the value of the rater agreement in
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the motive sub-cluster conveys the value of the agreement for the categories of
academician, practitioners, regulators and overall respondents or per category, as
shown by the p-values, which are significant at 1% and 5% levels.
The “characteristic sub-cluster” ANP results show that “universally accepted”
(44%) is the most important element, followed by “non-yield bearing” and “peer
to peer” (19%), “pseudonymous” (10%) and, finally, the element of “anonymity”
(7%). The value of the rater agreement in the characteristic sub-cluster shows
the agreement value for the academic category and overall respondents or per
category, as shown by the significant p-values at 1% and 5% levels.
Based on the highest inconsistency score of the respondents’ pairwise
comparison answers for the relationship between clusters in the ANP network, we
conclude that the consistency of the objective, function, characteristic and motive
sub-cluster index results for the two-layer ANP with BOCR approach meet the
consistency requirement because the inconsistency value is less than 10%.
B3. Priority Cluster in BOCR
The ANP results (see Table 4) for the entire BOCR cluster that has been processed
and analysed show that the top priority or the most important sub-cluster in the
formation of the CBDC model in Indonesia is benefit (34%). This is followed by the
risk sub-cluster (30%), then opportunities and costs (18%). The value of the rater
agreement in the BOCR cluster shows the agreement value for all respondents or
per category, as indicated by the significant p-value at 5%.
Table 4.
Two-layer ANP with BOCR Cluster
This table shows the geometric mean value to see the priority value of each category of respondents, the value of
agreement level based on Kendall’s W and the value of the consistency level of answers based on the inconsistency
value in the BOCR Criteria cluster. Note that, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.

1. Benefits
2. Opportunities
3. Costs
4. Risks
Inconsistency
Kendall’s W
X2
p-value

Practitioner

Academicians

Regulator

All

R

0.272
0.185
0.185
0.357
0.000
0.144
2.600
0.457

0.415
0.189
0.172
0.225
0.004
0.189
3.400
0.334

0.360
0.214
0.190
0.237
0.000
0.186
3.350
0.341

0.340
0.182
0.178
0.300
0.004
0.156
8.450
0.038**

1
3
4
2

Based on the highest inconsistency value of the respondents’ pairwise
comparison answers for the relationships between sub-clusters in the ANP
network, as shown in Table 4, we conclude that the consistency of the BOCR
cluster index test results for the one and two-layer ANP satisfies the consistency
requirement because the inconsistency value is less than 10%.
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B4. Priority Sub-Cluster in BOCR
The ANP results for the BOCR sub-criteria (see Table 5) show that the respondents
generally agreed that the most important element in the benefit cluster is
“payment system security efficiency” (31%), followed by “accounting records
and transparency” (23%), “unbanked public access” and “centralised financial
supervision” (16%), and finally “cost of printing and handling money” (13%).
Furthermore, the value of the rater agreement in the benefit cluster shows the
value of the agreement for the overall respondent or per category, as indicated by
significant p-value at 5%.
Table 5.
Detailed ANP BOCR Results
This table shows the geometric mean value to see the priority value of each category of respondents, the value of
agreement level based on Kendall’s W and the value of the consistency level of answers based on the inconsistency
value in the BOCR Criteria cluster. Note that, *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Practitioner
BENEFIT
1. Efficiency & safety
2. Accurate & transparant
3. Efficiency in cost of printing & handling
money
4. Acces for unbanked
5. Centralised financial surveilance
Inconsistency
Kendall’s W
X2
p-value
OPPORTUNITY
1. KYC principles & AML/CFT
2. Limiting private DC
3. Financial inclusion
4. Reduce asymmetric info
5. Monetary instrument
Inconsistency
Kendall’s W
X2
p-value
COSTS
1. Initial infrastructure cost
2. Access on tech
3. New tech & mechanism
4. Socialization
5. Technological issues
Inconsistency
Kendall’s W
X2
p-value

Academicians Regulator

All

R

0.273
0.268

0.294
0.232

0.314
0.237

0.315
0.230

1
2

0.158

0.147

0.100

0.135

5

0.139
0.162
0.003
0.154
3.700
0.448

0.180
0.147
0.003
0.249
5.967
0.202

0.160
0.188
0.006
0.286
6.867
0.143

0.160
0.160
0.003
0.153
11.033
0.026**

4
3

0.146
0.084
0.102
0.111
0.057
0.003
0.111
2.667
0.615

0.098
0.055
0.124
0.140
0.082
0.007
0.140
3.367
0.498

0.130
0.130
0.094
0.073
0.073
0.006
0.358
8.600
0.072*

0.116
0.086
0.116
0.116
0.065
0.008
0.130
9.389
0.052*

1
4
3
2
5

0.213
0.213
0.196
0.182
0.196
0.000
0.155
3.713
0.446

0.174
0.210
0.125
0.334
0.157
0.007
0.167
4.000
0.406

0.243
0.376
0.127
0.127
0.127
0.003
0.203
4.867
0.301

0.196
0.214
0.196
0.196
0.196
0.003
0.090
6.449
0.168

3
1
5
2
4
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Table 5.
Detailed ANP BOCR Results (Continued)
Practitioner
RISKS
1. Tech-dependence
2. Cyber risk
3. People behavior
4. Speed up bank run
5. Impaired lending
Inconsistency
Kendall’s W
X2
p-value

0.219
0.27
0.205
0.219
0.087
0.003
0.354
8.500
0.075*

Academicians Regulator
0.310
0.310
0.126
0.126
0.126
0.004
0.224
5.367
0.252

0.243
0.376
0.127
0.127
0.127
0.003
0.199
4.767
0.312

All

R

0.246
0.328
0.148
0.176
0.103
0.000
0.084
6.022
0.197

2
1
4
3
5

In the BOCR sub-criteria, respondents agreed that the most important elements
in the opportunity cluster are “KYC AML/CFT” (12%), “reducing asymmetric and
financial information” (12%), “limiting private digital currency” (9%), and “Nonconventional monetary policy instruments” (7%). The value of the rater agreement
in the opportunity cluster shows the value of the agreement both in the regulator
category, as well as, the overall respondents or per category, as indicated by the
p-values.
Besides, the detailed ANP results for the BOCR sub-criteria indicate that
the respondents generally agreed that the most important element in the costs
cluster is “technology access” (21%), followed by “unsafe from technology issues”,
“socialisation and community communication”, “initial costs-infrastructure”, and
“new mechanism technology”, all recording the same value of 20%. The value of the
rater agreement in the costs cluster shows the value of no agreement for the overall
respondent or by category, which is supported by the insignificant p-values. The
other detailed ANP results for the BOCR sub-criteria (see Table 5, “All” Column)
show that the respondents generally agreed that the most important element in
the risks cluster is “cyber risk” (33%), followed by “technology-dependent” (25%),
“speed up bank run” (18%), “people behaviour/mindset” (15%), and “impaired
lending” (10%). The value of the rater agreement in the risks sub-cluster shows the
value of the agreement for the category, as indicated by the significant p-value at
10%.
Based on the highest inconsistency value of the respondents’ pairwise
comparison answers for the relationships between clusters in the ANP network
(see Table 5,”all” Column), we conclude that benefit, opportunity, cost and
risks sub-cluster index for the two-layer ANP with BOCR meets the consistency
requirements because the inconsistency value is less than 10%.
C. The Selected CBDC Design: A Synthesis of the BOCR Approach
To select the best CBDC design from the different alternatives, we use Saaty and
Vargas’s (2006) approach, which compares the benefits with costs instead of using
a supermatrix. We modified their benefits–costs ratio by including opportunity
and risk. Table 6 shows the results of the BOCR assessment for alternative
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol23/iss3/3
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specifications of the CBDC model. The best specification of the CBDC model is the
one with the highest estimated value.
In order to evaluate the best model for the BOCR approach, we use several
BOCR-based formulas, following the Naenna and Jiamruangjarus (2016), Simelyte
et al. (2014), and Wijnmalen (2007), namely additive, probabilistic additive,
subtractive, multiplicative priority powers, and multiplicative formulas. The
results are shown in Table 6. We use a multiplicative formula in order to determine
short-term priorities and the probabilistic additive method to synthesise long-term
decisions.
Table 6.
BOCR Synthesis Results
This table shows the BOCR synthesis group values for alternative models based on the type of their respective
formulas.

Alternatives
BOCR
1. Cash Like
2. GP-Indirect-NIB
3. WH-Direct-IB
4. WH-Direct-NIB
5. GP-Direct-IB

Probabilistic
Subtractive
additive
0.2076
0.1987
0.1937
0.1939
0.2061

0.3468
0.1757
0.0780
0.0823
0.3171

Multiplicative
priority powers

Additive

Multiplicative

0.2048
0.2004
0.1914
0.1925
0.2109

0.2923
0.2440
0.1487
0.1490
0.1660

0.2035
0.1731
0.1766
0.1823
0.2643

Figure 3.
ANP Results–Short-Term Alternative
This figure shows the best alternative models in the short run based on multiplicative formula

0.30

1Cash Like

2GP, Indirect, NIB

3WH, Direct, IB

4WH, Direct, NIB

5GP, Direct, IB

0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00

Based on Figure 3 above, we conclude that the most prominent model chosen
by respondents in the short term is Model 5, namely GP, direct and interest-bearing.
In addition, the second most prominent is Model 1 (cash-like), followed by Model 4
(WH, direct and non-interest-bearing), Model 3 (WH, direct and interest-bearing),
and Model 2 (GP, indirect and non-interest-bearing). Thus, when it comes to the
initial appeal of CBDC use from the community’s perspective, Model 5 can be a
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public alternative to replacing the private digital currency. However, this model
cannot be used in the long-run because it can potentially cause the transfer of bank
deposits to the CBDC (bank deposit outflow) and change the banking system to
narrow banking. If there is a significant bank deposit outflow, then banks can no
longer rely on liabilities in the form of public savings.
Figure 4.
ANP Results – Long Term Alternative
This figure shows the best alternative models in the long run based on subtractive formula

0.210

1Cash Like

2GP, Indirect, NIB

3WH, Direct, IB

4WH, Direct, NIB

5GP, Direct, IB

0.205

0.200

0.195

0.190

0.185

From Figure 4, we can conclude that the best model chosen by the respondents
in the long term is Model 1, namely cash-like, which is followed by Model 5 (GP,
direct and interest-bearing), Model 2 (GP, indirect and non-interest-bearing),
Model 3 (WH and interest-bearing), and Model 4 (WH, indirect and interestbearing).
The choice of the cash-like model is appropriate because the cash-like CBDC
design involves high fees and thus requires a relatively long period of preparation.
Besides, the chosen cash-like CBDC design is in accordance with the predictions
of Six Group (2019), which argues that cash-like currency will replace currency
as a medium of exchange. However, currency will continue to be used as
a store of value and thus physical money will still be used. This is based on a
consideration of the need for business process sustainability in the event of power
disruptions, natural disasters, and others. Therefore, PwC (2019) added that any
consideration for issuing CBDC by the central bank should not ignore currency
but rather develop alternative payment methods and options for saving money.
Furthermore, the cash-like design chosen by experts in Indonesia is in line with
the notion of CBDC issuance as a method of payment that is not concerned with
convenience for consumers based on digitalisation trends. This is in line with the
view of RBNZ (2018), which argue that the most suitable characteristics of CBDC
are the cash-like model. These relate to the characteristics of digital currency in
that it can be exchanged in cash, it can be accessed by the public without certain
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restrictions, the public cannot borrow from the central bank, and the central bank
does not pay interest on digital currency.
D. Robustness Checks
We examine the robustness of our results using two methods. First, we vary the
BOCR approach to see whether the results are sensitive to this variation. Second,
we compare the two-layer ANP results with the one-layer ANP results.
D1. Sensitivity of the Results to Variation in BOCR
In this sensitivity analysis, we examine whether the results are sensitive to the
specification of the BOCR. Following (Saaty, 2006), we vary the relationship in
terms of benefits, opportunities, costs and risks, and report the results in Figure
5. Figures 5 shows that each model experiences insignificant changes when the
relationship changes (i.e. benefit, opportunity, cost, and risk). The changes that
arise do not alter the order and we thus conclude that Model 1 is the best result
based on the ratings given by the respondents.
Figure 5.
Sensitivity BOCR Graph
This figure shows the value of the sensitivity of the model when it is connected to the sub-cluster of benefits,
opportunities, costs and risks.
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Figure 5.
Sensitivity BOCR Graph (Continued)
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D2. One-layer ANP Results
To avoid any subjectivity associated with the BOCR weights, we also estimate onelayer ANP with the BOCR approach, and examine whether the results change as
we alter the model specification.
Figure 6.
ANP Results – Alternative ANP Floor 1
This figure shows the results of ANP BOCR 1 Floor in the CBDC Alternative Model Cluster
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Figure 6 shows that most of the respondents (representing 35% of the
population) preferred the cash-like model (Model 1), followed by the Model 2
(26%), Models 3 and 4 (14%), and Model 5 (11%). In other words, the one-layer
ANP model, like the two-layer ANP model, reveals that the cash-like model is the
most important model (see Figure 6). Hence, our baseline results, which are based
on the two-layer ANP with BOCR, are robust. We can conclude that the cash-like
model is the best CBDC model for Indonesia.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the Delphi–ANP approach, we show that the most considered strategic
criteria in CBDC issuance, particularly related to the smoothness of the payment
system, in Indonesia is objective. This is followed by the benefits (mainly related to
payment system efficiency and security), risk (primarily cyber risk), opportunity,
and cost. Our Delphi–ANP approach, which draws on BOCR methods to quantify
a basket of experts’ opinions revealed that the cash-like CBDC model is the most
suitable model, as it conforms to Indonesia’s conditions. The cash-like CBDC
model has similar characteristics as traditional currencies, which are universally
accessible, ensure anonymity, flexible to operate on peer-to-peer basis, as well as,
online, and non-yield bearing.
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Apart from finding that the most preferred model is cash-like CBDC, a tokenbased general-purpose CBDC, which has no interest-bearing attributes, we also
found that the second-best model to be implemented in Indonesia is generalpurpose direct interest-bearing CBDC. In a broad sense, these findings have a
similarity with the CBDC design developed by PBoC in 2020, which is a generalpurpose model. PwC (2019) suggests that the current Indonesian fintech industry
landscape is similar with early developments of fintech in China in 2013. Hence, the
general-purpose CBDC model might have comparative advantages to traditional
currency in terms of reducing the cost of printing and handling money, while also
minimising the impact of shadow banking, which often becomes a challenge in
emerging economies (Shirai, 2019).
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